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The research question presented in this analysis focuses on national fiscal rules applicable in the Visegrad 
Group (also called V4) expressed in the European standardised fiscal rules index and on their impact on 
the socio-economic policy. The use of fiscal rules as an instrument of fiscal sustainability is manifested 
by imposing requirements as regards borrowing and the costs of public debt service. A high level of 
debt can cause social development expenditure to be crowded out, contributing to growing development 
disparities in social and economic terms.
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Korelacja miÚdzy reguïami fiskalnymi ab zrównowaĝonym rozwojem 
krajów Grupy Wyszehradzkiej
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W artykule przedstawiono wyniki prowadzonych badañ w zakresie wpïywu stosowanych reguï fiskalnych 
na stabilny rozwój na przykïadzie krajów Grupy Wyszehradzkiej. Zdecydowano siÚ dokonaÊ badania 
zaleĝnoĂci tych dwóch zmiennych, poniewaĝ ich wykorzystanie jako instrumentu stabilnoĂci fiskalnej 
objawia siÚ naïoĝeniem róĝnego rodzaju ograniczeñ zwiÈzanych ze skalÈ wydatków, deficytu czy dïugu 
publicznego. W przeprowadzonej analizie polityka fiskalna oraz stabilny rozwój sÈ rozpatrywane za pomocÈ 
wskaěników dotyczÈcych stanu finansów publicznych, wyników ekonomicznych i wskaěników finanso-
wania zrównowaĝonego rozwoju.
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1. Introduction
The financial crisis that started in 2008 and the resulti ng economic slow-
down contributed to the quest for new legal, economic, and social solutions 
to ensure sustained stability of the financial system and long-term eco-
nomic development (Bergman & Hutchison, 2015; Bergmanand,  Hutchison, 
&bHougaard, 2016; Djalilov & Holscher, 2016). 
We attempt to investigate the impact of fiscal rules on the sustain-
ability of finance among the Visegrad Group countries (V4). We have 
chosen to analyse the impact of fiscal rules on the socio-economic policy 
in V4 because its members are neighbouring, Slavic (except Hungary), 
post-socialist countries where the economic transformation process was 
highly successful (Wyplosz, 2012, for more detail). The countries use their 
internal potential and the elements of competitive advantage, and strive 
for full integration with the EU. Thus far, only Slovakia has joined the 
monetary union and, consequently, the possible scenarios for the country’s 
economic policy take account of EU-level monetary policy coordination 
(Juncker, with Tusk, Dijsselbloem, Draghi & Schulz, 2015; Kopits, 2016). 
It must be kept in mind, however, that upon joining the eurozone, all V4 
countries will face ab similar challenge sooner or later. 
The research question presented in the paper focuses on analysing 
national fiscal rules applicable in respective V4 countries as expressed in 
the European standardised fiscal rules index and on their impact on the 
socio-economic policy in place while identifying any imbalances that occur. 
We investigate whether national fiscal rules not only influence the condi-
tion of public finance, but also contribute to socio-economic change and, 
if so, to what extent. 
The use of fiscal rules as an instrument of fiscal sustainability is mani-
fe sted by imposing requirements regarding borrowing and the costs of public 
debt service (Bernanke, 2010). A high level of debt can cause social develop-
ment expenditure to be crowded out, contributing to growing development 
disparities in social and economic terms. 
Fiscal rules became quite abuniversally used instrument to prevent an 
irresponsible fiscal policy, though, on the other hand, it should be also 
noted that the continuously increasing complexity of the fiscal rules, fre-
quent modifications, and the growing number of exceptions do not favour 
running ab transparent fiscal policy, especially over ab long term, which is 
most desirable (Deutsche Bundesbank, 2015). An attempt was also made 
on several occasions to empirically evaluate the impact of fiscal rules on 
the stability of fiscal policy. Such an attempt will be also made, to ablimited 
extent, in the empirical part of this paper. Countries with greater transpar-
ency of public finance are characterised by abgreater fiscal discipline and, 
in many cases, also enjoy high economic growth (Kopits, 2001). Theb key 
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factor driving the effectiveness of ab given fiscal rule is the electorate’s 
political will and/or awareness of the need for fiscal tightening (Balas-
sone & Franco, 2001). Its absence may lead to postponing, suspending, 
or introducing only partly the legal instruments governing the scope of 
fiscal policy. Fatas and Mihov (2004), based on abpanel model analysis of 
48 US states between the years 1963 and 2000, conclude that fiscal rules 
have abmajor impact on the government spending elasticity to the business 
cycle. According to the authors, such ab correlation has both positive and 
negative effects. On the one hand, fiscal policy becomes more destabilis-
ing in the states where ‘stricter’ fiscal rules are in place. Yet, on the other 
hand, the internal and external restrictions imposed represent an effective 
limit to discretionary actions, thus smoothening the business cycle. The 
study results indicate that the latter effect of fiscal rules is stronger, which 
leads us to conclude that fiscal rules have abmajor role in limiting cycle 
volatility.
The purpose of the article is to assess the impact of national fiscal rules 
on the stability of fiscal policy. We will attempt to prove that an assess-
ment based on the fiscal rule strength index as applied by the European 
Commission has no significant positive effect on public debt developments 
in V4 countries (public debt measured as ab share of GDP). We will also 
answer the question of to what extent the economic growth in V4 countries 
measured with GDP growth depends on the value of fiscal rule index. We 
believe that fiscal rules are of significance to running ab responsible fiscal 
policy but they should not be contemplated in isolation from quality of 
life indicators in abgiven country. We will try to demonstrate that focusing 
solely on public debt and budget deficit indicators in relation to GDP does 
not meet the contemporary challenges faced by the socio-economic policy. 
To address this topic is of special importance amid the ongoing discussions 
on the new economic paradigms and the role of fiscal policy in stimulat-
ing sustainable socio-economic development, especially in countries such 
as V4, which in terms of development are still catching up with the “old” 
European Union Member States.
The paper presents the results of research into the impact of the stage 
of implementation of fiscal rules, measured with the European fiscal rules 
index, on: 
(1) fiscal sustainability, 
(2) public finance stability, 
(3) sustainable development.
A mixed method combining the results of qualitative and quantitative 
resear ch will be used to empirically verify the hypotheses related to the 
research question presented. Qualitative research is based on ab descrip-
tive analysis, and quantitative research will include statistical information 
systemisation based on data analysis, static dependence methodology.
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2. Sustainable Development Versus Fiscal Sustainability 
andbPublic Finance  Stability 
The European Union, as part of its initiatives (European Commis-
sion, 2018), aims to implement economic solutions based on the concept 
of sustainable development. A document prepared and published by the 
High-Level Expert Group (European Commission, 2018) ‘maps out the 
challenges and opportunities that the EU faces in developing ab sustainable 
finance policy. It identifies ways in which the financial sector can re-connect 
with the real economy to support the transition to ab more resource-efficient 
and more circular economy. The group argues that reorienting investment 
flows into long-term, sustainable projects will also improve the stability of 
the financial system’. The document indicates the lines of action aimed to 
achieve abdurable and sustainable development based on efforts to combine 
economic welfare with environmental and social sustainability. Sustainable 
development requires ablong-term horizon and ensuring long-term funding 
for the critical infrastructure as well as an adequate response to long-term 
threats. As part of those actions, it is also concluded that the objective 
of sustainable development must be supported by sustainability finance. 
Real economic and financial activities have increasingly overstepped state 
borders as reflected in absharp increase in the cross-border liabilities, and 
made the achievement of these financial system goals even more effective 
(Rutkauskas, 2015). Such real actions are due to the fact that the financial 
system is an element of the economic system, which consists of two prin-
cipal components: public finance sector and market-based finance system 
(Holscher, 2017). Actions undertaken as part of the sustainability finance 
concept could contribute to changing the orientation of finance measures 
and to strengthening the efforts to generate ablong-term positive impact on 
the socio-economic development (Chapman, 2008). Actions undertaken in 
this field can be exemplified by various types of investments and initiatives 
generating social and economic benefits. The European Commission has 
developed ab general outline of sustainability standards, in which detailed 
specifications of financial products standards, the course of the process 
and information to recipients (labels) were made. (European Commis-
sion, 2017). A particular role and importance in this respect is ascribed 
to public authorities, which use public finance to achieve sustainable 
development. 
Fiscal sustainability is defined in abrather standard way: the fiscal policy 
is said to be sustainable if the present value of the future primary surpluses 
equals the current level of debt (Krejdl, 2006). Actions pursued by public 
finance sector institutions with regard to maintaining fiscal sustainability 
and public finance stability must be considered, as abrule, from two perspec-
tives: narrow and broad. In ab narrow perspective, public finance stability 
is defined as measures oriented to maintaining budget stability. Their goal 
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is to maintain budget deficit and public debt below the threshold set by 
Maastricht criteria (Hagen von & Wolf, 2004). This means that abbroadly 
defined concept of fiscal sustainability is directly related to fiscal policy 
and to the value and dynamics of public debt.
G. KeliuotytÙ-StaniulÙnienÙ (2015) distinguishes between three approaches 
to identifying public finance stability:
• In the first approach, the fiscal balance relates to solvency. It is abcur-
rent ability to service debts.
• As part of the second approach, sustainable fiscal policy is aimed to 
ensure an adequate (as required by the legal provisions) debt to GDP 
ratio.
• The third approach is the broadest one as it takes account of both 
solvency and of limiting the growth of public debt.
It should be emphasised that public finance stability relates to long-term, 
multi-aspect actions that are determined by ab major impact of external 
factors, such as, for example, business cycle, monetary policy that takes 
account of the current and future cost of money and the exchange rate 
(Cecchetti & Kharroubi, 2012).
Furthermore, when considering public authorities’ efforts to maintain 
public finance stability, attention should be paid to the need for the public 
sector to always fulfil its principal functions, as well as the prevention of 
long-term imbalance in public finance. This can be achieved by developing 
an effective public spending and revenue system for the public finance sec-
tor. Fiscal consolidation in case of abrapidly increasing public debt level can 
clearly be welcomed as abway to restore fiscal sustainability (Bohn, 1998). 
Also the ratio of public finance revenues and expenditures to GDP (Berti 
etbal., 2016) shows the size of the public sector of the economy. The question 
arises as to whether the fiscal rules currently applied at the national and 
European levels enable authorities using this fiscal instrument to achieve 
the objectives that are inherent in the concept of sustainability develop-
ment. In this context, it is important to examine whether the instruments 
applied as part of fiscal rules adopted at the EU and national levels not 
only contribute to issues related to fiscal sustainability and public finance 
stability, but whether they take account of elements that are required to 
achieve sustainability development and finance sustainability.
3. Fiscal Rules as an Instrument 
to Ensure Public Finance Discipline
In post-co mmunist countries fiscal rules are abtool that fit s squarely into 
the characteristics of ab transparent fiscal policy (Agénor & Yilmaz, 2011; 
Buiter, 2005). This is mainly due to democracy being relatively young and 
to the lack of well-structured institutional and collegial structures. Of key 
importance here is the increased predictability of the activities undertaken 
Jens Hölscher, Marta Postuïa, Agnieszka Aliñska, Jarosïaw Klepacki
38 DOI 10.7172/1644-9584.83.2
within the public sector. Indirectly, the use of fiscal rules can also enforce 
the implementation of the necessary system reforms and activity of central 
banks (Dabrowski, 2016; Larch, 2016). The purposes of the rules should 
be established consistently with their structure, or their scale of impact. 
Rules often provide the basis of fiscal policy and are intended to discipline 
public finance and limit its imbalance as well as to promote sustainable 
economic growth. It remains important to keep in mind that, when it comes 
to evaluating fiscal sustainability risks, abholistic approach is required, and 
no simple metric will ever be able in itself to fully capture the ability of 
ab sovereign to honour its debt (Berti et al., 2016).
Fiscal rules are abpermanent constraint on fiscal policy through numerical 
limits on budget aggregates (Kopits & Symanski, 1998). Fiscal rules can be 
divided into procedural and numerical ones. Procedural rules involve, among 
others, legislative procedures, establishing proper institutional framework 
with respect to transparency of the budget process, control and sanction 
mechanisms (Schaechter, 2012; Calmfors, 2015). Meanwhile, numerical rules 
consist in setting fiscal thresholds with respect to, first and foremost, public 
debt, budget deficit, public expenditure and public revenues. 
The predominant fiscal rules applied in OECD countries are debt rules 
(62 countries) and budget balance rules (61 countries). In the early 1990s, 
only five countries worldwide (Germany, Indonesia, Japan, Luxembourg, 
and the USA) had in place regulations related to fiscal rules. At the end 
of 2012, as many as 76 OECD member states had regulations introducing 
ab long-term discipline in the public finance sector (fiscal rules at the level 
of general government). These included rules implemented at both the 
national and the supranational levels.
In the European Union, there are two levels of fiscal rule implemen-
tation: (1) EU level and (2) national level. At the same time, in many 
countries, e.g. in Poland, additional constraints on local government bor-
rowing are also used. The purpose of introducing rules at the supranational 
EU-wide level is to discipline national policies (European Commission, 
2006, 2008, 2012, for more detail). The Stability and Growth Pact and its 
later amendments, or the ‘six-pack’ and ‘two-pack’, apply to non-eurozone 
EU Member States only to ab limited extent. For the eurozone countries, 
these regulations are definitely more rigorous as they introduce monetary 
sanctions of up to 0.5% of GDP. The Stability and Growth Pact has two 
arms: preventive and repressive. In its preventive arm, the European Council 
focused on the provisions strengthening the surveillance of Member States’ 
budget positions and of their economic policy (Fourçans & Warin, 2007). 
To fulfil those provisions, Member States prepare and submit stabilisation 
programmes (applicable to the eurozone countries) and convergence pro-
grammes (applicable to the other countries). The repressive arm involves 
the excessive deficit procedure and the attendant sanctions if abeurozone 
country fails to meet the recommendations of the European Commis-
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sion and the European Council (Council of the European Union, 2011). 
ThebEuropean Commission annually evaluates the scale and effectiveness of 
the fiscal rules used by Member States, its opinion being expressed in the 
form of the standardised fiscal rules index created and monitored by the 
European Commission. The index is based on the information on the stage 
of implementation of fiscal rules in abgiven EU Member State. Thebbasis 
for its calculation is the fiscal rule strength index (FRSI), which takes 
account of five principal criteria: (1) the statutory base of the rule, (2) the 
room for revising objectives, (3) the mechanisms of monitoring compliance 
and enforcement of the rule, (4) the existence of pre-defined enforcement 
mechanism, and (5) media visibility of the rule. This methodology was 
inspired by Deroose, Moulin and Wierts (2005). For the above criteria, 
results are allocated in the following way for each rule: the compound 
FRSI is calculated for each rule, aggregating the above results.
If there is no strong theoretical basis or preference as to the weight to 
be given to each criterion, the index is calculated in many different ways, 
reflecting various possible weights for the five criteria. The scores for the 
five criteria are first standardised to ensure they range from 0 to 1. Then, 
the random weights technique is used, based on the method applied by 
Sutherland et al. (2005). This technique uses 10,000 sets of randomly gen-
erated weights to calculate the index in 10,000 different ways. Random 
weights come from the even distribution between zero and one, and then 
are normalised to one. The resulting index distribution reflects the possible 
range of values while no abpriori information is provided about the weight 
to be given to each of the components. Considering the weights are drawn 
from an even distribution, and the mean value of the compound index is 
asymptotically equivalent to the index calculated using identical weights 
for components, this is ab non-weighted arithmetic mean of the criteria. 
A stronger anti-cyclical effect of fiscal rules is also demonstrated by the 
results of studies conducted by Guerguil, Mandon and Tapsoba (2016) and 
Bergman and Hutchinson (2015).
A similar conclusions is reached by Manasse (2006) based on the results 
of his study conducted for 49 developed and developing countries for the 
period from 1970 to 2004. Manasse builds abpanel based on the fiscal reac-
tion function. Relying on the paper by Kopits and Symansky (1998) among 
others, he identifies countries and years where fiscal rules were in effect. 
Moreover, in our opinion, numerical restrictions imposed on institutions 
responsible for fiscal policy also contribute, on average, to the deficit going 
down. Hence, they are an instrument that stabilises fiscal policy both in 
the short and long term (Kasdin, 2018). 
Ayuso-i-Casals et al. (2006), to examine the impact of rules on the fis-
cal policy in 25 EU countries in the period from 1990 to 2005, construct 
time-varying indices, comparable between respective countries, reflecting 
the strength and scope of applicability of respective types of rules (those 
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imposed on expenditure, revenues, deficit and debt). They create these 
based on the results of ab survey conducted by the European Commission 
in 2006 (European Commission, 2006) and include respective fiscal rule 
index sequences as an additional variable in model panels based on the 
fiscal reaction function. It turns out that while rules applicable to defi-
cit and debt have ab marked positive impact on the balance, the impact 
of expenditure rules on the level of expenditure has proved statistically 
insignificant.
A detailed and elaborate analysis using this index leads us to infer, 
among other things, the stabilising impact of fiscal rules in countries where 
the rules are structured in abway not to disrupt the stabilising function of 
the fiscal policy (Poterba, 1994, 1996).
Turrini (2008), in turn, focuses on analysing the impact of expenditure 
rules on fiscal policy. The aim of this study is to verify the assumption 
that expenditure rules in fact effectively limit the expenditure expansion 
in the periods of fast economic growth, and to test the hypothesis of their 
stabilising impact on the fiscal policy. Based on the data from the afore-
mentioned survey conducted by the European Commission, he divides EU 
Member States into those where, between the years 1990 and 2005, strong 
and weak expenditure rules were in effect, analysing separately those two 
groups of countries. This analysis confirms the hypothesis of ab significant 
role of strong expenditure rules in limiting destabilisation of the fiscal policy 
at times of economic upturn. 
The impact of fiscal rules on the broadly defined stabilising function of 
the fiscal policy was researched from several perspectives before the crisis 
(Schaechter, Kinda, Budina, & Weber, 2012). 
It follows from the analysis of the IMF (2017) dataset that in the early 
1990s, of all the EU Member States analysed, only Estonia introduced 
abnumerical fiscal rule, which disciplined the rules of public spending (Bova, 
Kinda, Muthoora, & Toscani, 2015). In general, in the early 1990s, all 
over the EU there were only 13 fiscal rules in effect. By contrast, in 2010, 
70b numerical fiscal rules were already in place, of which 16 were in the 
EEC countries analysed (Reuter, 2015; Portes & Wren-Lewis, 2015). As of 
the end of 2014, the most developed framework for disciplining the fiscal 
policy was in place in Poland and Slovakia. In these countries, there were 
four fiscal rules applicable at the end of 2014. 
In sum mary, in the period analysed, the Visegrad Group countries, 
despite the excessive deficit procedures imposed on them, were quite effec-
tive in their attempts to meet the economic integration criteria set out 
in the Treaty. They definitely had ab greater problem meeting the deficit 
criterion than the one related to public debt. The global financial crisis 
showed that external factors play ab major role in the disturbance in the 
area of debt financing (issuance of government bonds). Debt management 
measures taking account of the current and future changes in the external 
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environment must be oriented to maintaining the balance between the con-
dition of public finance and the market (commercial) aspect. Hence, such 
balance is defined as measures intended to maintain safety through inte-
grated continued debt servicing and contracting new obligations (e.g.bissuing 
bonds).
The research question in this context is: Do fiscal rules applied by the 
Visegrad Group countries contribute to efforts to only achieve and maintain 
the required deficit and debt values, or do they play ab role in achieving 
the optimal level of sustainability finance. 
The research sample consists of the V4 member states, which, as Euro-
pean Union Member States, are obliged to apply supranational fiscal rules 
supported by national solutions at the central and local levels. The years 
between 2005 and 2016 are adopted as the research period (due to the 
comparability of data). Data in this period include all full years of those 
countries’ membership of the EU. 
The point of departure for the analysis conducted was the pre-defined 
standardised fiscal rules index and the available data in this respect.
The standardised fiscal rules index values in the period analysed for the 
Visegrad Group countries compared to the European Union as abwhole 
are presented by data in Figure 1.
2005
–1.5
–1.0
–0.5
0
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1.0
1.5
2.0
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3.0
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2006 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 20162007
Czech Rebublik Hungary Poland Slovakia
Fig. 1. Standardised fiscal rules index in the years between 2005 and 2016 in the Visegrad 
Group countries. Source: Own compilation based on the European Commission’s data.
The explanatory variables for the fiscal rules index were three vari-
able categories selected based on knowledge of the field (set of potential 
explanatory variables), and then these were selected using Hellwig’s method 
(Hellwing, 1990).
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4. Methodology and Data
The first fiscal rule index analysis conducted by us consists in observing 
the value of this index in respective V4 Member States over the period 
between 2001 and 2016.
Another element of the analysis applied to fiscal rules in V4 Member 
States is their impact on budget deficit and public debt developments – this 
makes ab reference to the hypothesis whereby an assessment based on the 
fiscal rule index as used by the European Commission has no significant 
effect on public debt developments (measured as ab share of GDP).
Considering that ab high fiscal rule index should be indicative of high 
restrictiveness of fiscal rules, it should also reflect ab given country’s eco-
nomic situation. A restrictive fiscal policy oriented to reducing the budget 
deficit and public debt based on the fiscal rules defined may cause ablower 
economic growth and diminish citizens’ quality of life, consequently leading 
to abcrisis. Having that in mind, we will also conduct an analysis of inter-
dependencies between the fiscal rule index and quantities such as public 
investment and consumption.
The first variable group referred to economic results achieved at abgiven 
level of fiscal index, especially: real GDP growth rate, gross domestic prod-
uct at market prices in millions of euros, final consumption expenditure 
in millions of euros, final consumption expenditure index 2010 = 100, 
labour productivity and unit labour costs index 2010 = 100, purchasing 
power parities (PPPs), price level indices and real expenditures for ESA 
2010b aggregates, real expenditure (in PPS_EU28), and gross capital for-
mation indexb 2010 = 100. The selected parameters indicating the level of 
economic development contain the economic growth parameter in real and 
nominal terms as well as the principal economic aggregates having abmajor 
impact on generating this growth.
The second group involves indicators that are directly related to the 
condition of public finance, on which fiscal rules should have the strongest 
impact, according to the original assumption. The indicators defined in the 
Treaty of Maastricht were analysed (deficit and public debt to GDP ratios), 
broken down into the central government and local government sectors, 
as well as long-term lines of public intervention, i.e. the ratio of public 
finance revenues and expenditures to GDP and their structure, as well as 
financial market’s evaluation of the measures adopted by the authorities, 
in the form of profitability of long-term treasury bonds.
The last group of factors studied refers to issues involving abbroadly-defined 
category measuring sustainability finance. According to theoreticians and 
practitioners from the OECD, among others, fiscal policy has abdirect impact 
on generating abmajor part of GDP and creates abreal potential for increas-
ing citizens’ welfare. To this end, indicators such as the following indices 
were selected: Gini coefficient, resource productivity and domestic material 
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consumption (DMC), purchasing power adjusted GDP per capita, people 
at risk of poverty or social exclusion. 
As part of the research activities undertaken, Pearson’s r correlation 
analysis was first conducted. It is abparametric method to study the relation-
ship between two variables measured on abquantitative scale. Statistically 
significant results mean that there is abrelationship between variables. Rela-
tionships between variables can be positive (when one variable increases, so 
does the other one) or negative (when one variable increases, the other one 
decreases). Pearson’s r coefficient may have values ranging fromb–1b tob1. 
Results close to 0 mean no correlation, while results close to –1 andb1 mean 
abstrong correlation, abnegative and positive one, respectively. Thebstrength 
of the relationship may be measured with the following intervals: 0–0.1 no 
correlation, 0.1–0.3 weak, 0.3–0.5 moderate, 0.5–0.7 strong, 0.7–0.9 very 
strong, 0.9–1 nearly full correlation. 
Then, as the next step of research, for variables for which the correlation 
analysis yielded statistically significant results, series of regression analyses 
were conducted to study the impact of the standardised fiscal rules index on 
the other indicators. The regression analysis studies the predictor’s impact 
on the quantitative dependent variable. The significance of the impact is 
tested by t statistics and its corresponding level of statistical significance. 
The standardised coefficient ȕ corresponds to Person’s r. Non-standardised 
B coefficient and its SE error can be also presented in the description of 
results. This coefficient determines by what factor the dependent variable 
analysed will increase if the level of the standardised fiscal rules index goes 
up by 1 unit. R2 determination coefficient is also expressed, which shows 
the percentage of dependent variable explained by the standardised fiscal 
rules index. The higher the R2, the better the standardised fiscal rules 
index describes the variation of the indicator analysed.
The results of model studies from this stage are broken down into 
countries analysed.
A statistically significant impact of the standardised fiscal rules index on 
abnumber of financial, economic and social variables was demonstrated for 
the Czech Republic (Table 1). The strongest positive impact was demon-
strated for total general government expenditure in millions of euros (basic 
research). The 80% variation for total general government expenditure in 
millions of euros (basic research) was explained by the variation in the 
standardised fiscal rules index. A negative impact on government bond 
10-year yield and local government expenditure as % of GDP was also 
demonstrated. The standardised fiscal rules index had abvery strong effect 
on government bond 10-year yield in the Czech Republic, this variation 
being explained at 79%.
The analysis for Hungary also demonstrated ab number of variables 
influenced by the standardised fiscal rules index achieved (Table 1). The 
strongest positive impact was demonstrated for total general government 
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b Czech Republic Hungary Poland Slovakia
Standardised fiscal rules index 0.91 (6.83)*** 0.71 (3.15)* 0.68 (2.93)* 0.88 (5.92)***
Economic growth indicators
Real GDP growth rate –0.18 (–0.59) 0.23 (0.75) –0.19 (–0.62) –0.24 (–0.8)
Gross domestic product at market prices in millions of euros 0.58 (2.23)* 0.61 (2.45)* 0.77 (3.83)** 0.67 (2.89)*
Final consumption expenditure in millions of euros 0.58 (2.23)* 0.61 (2.45)* 0.77 (3.83)** 0.67 (2.89)*
Final consumption expenditure index 2010 = 100 0.72 (3.25)** 0.38 (1.31) 0.66 (2.79)* 0.59 (2.3)*
Labour productivity and unit labour costs index 0.7 (3.12)* 0.42 (1.46) 0.66 (2.81)* 0.79 (4.08)**
Purchasing power parities, price level indices and real expen-
ditures for ESA 2010 aggregates, real expenditure 0.84 (4.85)*** 0.78 (3.94)** 0.72 (3.24)** 0.82 (4.5)**
Public finance indicators
Gross capital formation index 0.03 (0.09) –0.14 (–0.45) 0.82 (4.55)** 0.13 (0.4)
Public debt as abpercentage of gross domestic product (GDP) 0.71 (3.2)** 0.26 (0.86) 0.33 (1.1) 0.88 (5.83)***
Percentage of gross domestic product (GDP) 0.08 (0.25) –0.72 (–3.26)** –0.55 (–2.08) 0.76 (3.76)**
government bond 10-year yield –0.89 (–6.16)*** –0.7 (–3.1)* –0.5 (–1.83) –0.93 (–7.72)***
Total general government expenditure as % of GDP –0.15 (–0.47) –0.3 (–0.99) –0.75  (–3.56)** 0.49 (1.78)
Total general government expenditure in millions of euros 0.53 (1.88) 0.8 (4.04)** 0.71 (3.06)* 0.71 (3.05)*
Total general government expenditure in millions of euros – 
public debt transactions 0.44 (1.45) 0.03 (0.09) 0.43 (1.43) 0.9 (6.35)***
Total general government expenditure in millions of euros – 
general public services 0.34 (1.08) 0.57 (2.11) 0.7 (2.95)* 0.77 (3.62)**
Total general government expenditure in millions of euros – 
executive and legislative organs, financial and fiscal affairs, 
external affairs 0.22 (0.68) 0.54 (1.93) 0.8 (3.96)** 0.6 (2.26)
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Total general government expenditure in millions of euros – 
general services 0.31 (0.98) 0.51 (1.79) 0.68 (2.78)* 0.72 (3.09)*
Total general government expenditure in millions of euros – 
foreign economic aid –0.15 (–0.46) –0.3 (–0.93) 0.64 (2.5)* 0.64 (2.53)*
Total general government expenditure in millions of euros – 
basic research 0.9 (6.03)*** –0.23 (–0.7) 0.77 (3.68)** 0.69 (2.88)*
Total general government expenditure in millions of euros– 
R&D, general public services 0.51 (1.77) 0.88 (5.61)*** 0.14 (0.41) 0.35 (1.13)
Total general government revenue as % of GDP 0.76 (3.67)** 0.56 (2.15) –0.08 (–0.27) 0.84 (4.89)***
Central government expenditure as % of GDP –0.26 (–0.85) 0.08 (0.26) –0.52 (–1.93) 0.3 (1.01)
Central government revenue as % of GDP 0.54 (2.05) 0.61 (2.43)* –0.09 (–0.29) 0.71 (3.17)**
 Local government expenditure as % of GDP –0.59 (–2.29)* –0.66 (–2.75)* –0.46 (–1.64) 0.08 (0.27)
Local government revenue as % of GDP –0.34 (–1.15) –0.73 (–3.42)** –0.22 (–0.7) 0.64 (2.67)*
General Government deficit/surplus as % of GDP 0.52 (1.92) 0.61 (2.4)* 0.58 (2.26)* 0.4 (1.39)
Central government deficit/surplus as % of GDP 0.51 (1.87) 0.59 (2.3)* 0.63 (2.6)* 0.38 (1.28)
Local government deficit/surplus as % of GDP 0.72 (3.25)** 0.22 (0.72) 0.55 (2.06) 0.63 (2.57)*
Social development indicators
Gini coefficient –0.37 (–1.26) –0.04 (–0.12) –0.67 (–2.85)* 0.80 (4.15)**
Resource productivity and domestic material consumption (DMC) 0.87 (5.66)*** 0.23 (0.75) 0.62 (2.49)* 0.88 (5.98)***
Purchasing power adjusted GDP per capita 0.83 (4.74)** 0.77 (3.85)** 0.82 (4.48)** 0.82 (4.5)**
People at risk of poverty or social exclusion –0.60 (–2.37)* –0.69 (–3.05)* –0.66 (–2.76)* –0.57 (–2.18)
* p < 0,001;  ** p < 0,01;  *** p < 0,05.
Tab. 1. Correlation analysis results for economic growth indicators, public finance indicators, social development indicators. Source: Own compilation.
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expenditure in millions of euros, and the negative one on general public 
services, and 78% of the variation of that variable was explained by the 
variation of the standardised fiscal rules index. Negative impacts were also 
demonstrated in Hungary on the level of percentage of gross domestic prod-
uct (GDP), government bond 10-year yield, local government expenditure 
as abpercentage of GDP, local government revenue as abpercentage of GDP, 
and people at risk of poverty or social exclusion. The strongest negative 
impact was demonstrated for local government revenue, with 54% of its 
variation explained by the variation of the standardised fiscal rules index.
A number of correlations were also demonstrated for Poland (Tableb1). 
The strongest positive impact was demonstrated for the gross capital for-
mation index and purchasing power adjusted GDP per capita, and 67% 
of the variability of those indicators was explained by the variability of 
the standardised fiscal rules index. Meanwhile, the strongest negative rela-
tionship was demonstrated for total general government expenditure as 
abpercentage of GDP.
Slovakia was the V4 country for which the largest number of statistically 
significant correlations with the standardised fiscal rules index was dem-
onstrated (Table 1). The strongest positive relationship was demonstrated 
for total general government expenditure in millions of euros (public debt 
transactions). By contrast, the strongest negative relationship for Slovakia 
was demonstrated for government bond 10-year yield.
The study results obtained indicate that the condition of V4 economies, 
as well as their financial and economic results, are not only the outcome of 
the fiscal policy and of the assessment of the condition of public finance. 
The imbalance of the economic system can also have its roots in the pri-
vate sector rather than the public sector. Before the outbreak of the crisis 
in the eurozone it was pointed out (Barrel, 2001; Alves & Afonso, 2007) 
that, considering the inability to use monetary policy, the acceptable fiscal 
deficit levels are too weak to effectively absorb asymmetric shocks, and 
the adjustment required in convergence programmes will have ab strong 
pro-cyclical effect.
5. Results 
Research conducted in V4 countries into the impact of the fiscal rules 
index not only on the condition of public finance but, in broader terms, of 
socio-economic development helped to address the propositions.
This analysis focused, first of all, on the impact of fiscal rules in the 
V4 countries on GDP growth and the level of its composing economic 
aggregates. 
The results obtained indicate that in all countries analysed statistically, 
significant and positive trends were observed for nearly all economic growth 
indicators depending on the standardised fiscal rules index. Such ab result 
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shows that the fiscal rules applied have no negative impact on Visegrad 
Group countries’ economic growth, so the pattern described below did 
not materialise. If the government increases spending and, at the same 
time, cuts taxes and does so at the time of recession (when tax revenues 
are falling), such measures can lead to abgrowing budget deficit. A deficit 
increase, in turn, will make it necessary for the government to issue more 
debt securities which will have to be paid for in the future. If the debt is 
not paid back on time, it will grow each year, forcing the government to 
encourage investors to buy new debt securities by increasing their interest 
rate. This move will increase the yield of treasury debt securities but will 
make them competitive to investment such as consumer and mortgage 
loans, car loans, and industrial bonds. This situation may lead to higher 
costs of credit for other market participants, who, in turn, may contribute 
to lower household spending, as well as to companies reducing their capi-
tal expenditure. When the government has problems paying off the public 
debt, the interest rate of treasury debt securities may grow too high and 
then those in power, to cover the deficit, may opt to print more money. 
However, for this to be possible, one condition must be met: public debt 
must be denominated in the national currency. This strategy is called ‘deficit 
monetisation’. Its mechanism is precisely the same as that of quantitative 
easing, but such public debt reduction has little to do with combating defla-
tion as ‘monetisation’ is only intended to get rid of the debt. Such conduct, 
when money competes with goods and causes their prices to go up, must 
lead to inflation, resulting in yet higher interest rates and abhigher share 
of private sector spending going to aid for the public sector. The rules 
defined in V4 countries do not follow this pattern of thinking about eco-
nomic growth. Unfortunately, there exists no fiscal stimulus that has only 
advantages as fiscal policy instruments (unlike monetary policy instruments 
which can be implemented right away) take time to implement and involve 
costs of inadequate expenditure and unnecessary legislation designed to 
get more votes in the election. The results of model research in the V4 
countries also confirm this. A flawless fiscal stimulus package should result 
in higher revenues and faster economic growth in the future, among other 
things. For the Czech Republic (Table 1) it was demonstrated that the stan-
dardised fiscal rules index was strongly and positively correlated with gross 
domestic product at market prices in millions of euros (r = 0.58; p < 0.05) 
and final consumption expenditure in millions of eurosb(r = 0.58; p < 0.05). 
Very strong correlations were also demonstrated for this country between 
the standardised fiscal rules index and the final consumption expenditure 
index (r = 0.72; p < 0.01), the labour productivity and unit labour costs 
index (r = 0.70; p < 0.01) and purchasing power parities, price level indices 
and real expenditures for ESA 2010 aggregates, real expenditure (r = 0.84; 
p < 0.001). The analysis for Hungary demonstrated that there was abstatis-
tically significant, positive, adequately strong and very strong correlation 
Jens Hölscher, Marta Postuïa, Agnieszka Aliñska, Jarosïaw Klepacki
48 DOI 10.7172/1644-9584.83.2
between some variables. The standardised fiscal rules index was strongly and 
positively correlated with gross domestic product at market prices in millions 
of euros (r = 0.61; p < 0.05), final consumption expenditure in millions of 
euros (r = 0.61; p < 0.05) and purchasing power parities, price level indices 
and real expenditures for ESA 2010 aggregates, real expenditure (r = 0.78; 
p < 0.001). The increase of the standardised fiscal rules index was correlated 
with the increase of those indicators in Hungary. It is worth noting that no 
statistically significant correlations were demonstrated for Hungary between 
the standardised fiscal rules index and the final consumption expenditure 
index and the labour productivity and unit labour costs index. In Poland, the 
existence of statistically significant and very strong and strong correlations 
was demonstrated between the standardised fiscal rules index and gross 
domestic product at market prices in millions of euros (r = 0.77; p < 0.01), 
final consumption expenditure in millions of euros (r = 0.77; p < 0.01), the 
final consumption expenditure index (r = 0.66; p < 0.05), the labour pro-
ductivity and unit labour costs index (r = 0.66; p < 0.05) and purchasing 
power parities, price level indices and real expenditures for ESA 2010 
aggregates, real expenditure (r = 0.72; p < 0.01). The increase of the stan-
dardised fiscal rules index was correlated with the increase of the other 
indicators in Poland. Similarly, it was demonstrated for Slovakia that the 
level of standardised fiscal rules index was statistically significantly posi-
tively and strongly correlated with gross domestic product at market prices 
in millions of euros (r = 0.67; p < 0.05), final consumption expenditure in 
millions of euros (r = 0.67; p < 0.05), the final consumption expenditure 
index (r = 0.59; p < 0.05), the labour productivity and unit labour costs 
index (r = 0.79; p < 0.01) and purchasing power parities, price level indices 
and real expenditures for ESA 2010 aggregates, real expenditure (r = 0.82; 
p < 0.001). The increase of the standardised fiscal rules index was correlated 
with the increase of the other indicators in Slovakia.
Another group of factors directly refers to the impact of the increase 
of the standardised fiscal rules index on the condition of public finance as 
it is important to establish whether the main expected outcome for which 
the rules were defined has been successfully achieved. 
The results obtained indicate correlations, with different scales, and these 
are directly dependent on the type of fiscal rules used by respective countries. 
The analysis found one correlation shared by all the countries, namely an 
inverse correlation between the interest rate of long-term securities and the 
increase of the standardised fiscal rules index. For the Czech Republic (Table 
1), negative correlations were also demonstrated between the standardised 
fiscal rules index and government bond 10-year yield (r = 0.89; p < 0.001); 
in Hungary, the standardised fiscal rules index was negatively correlated 
with the percentage of gross domestic product (GDP) (r = 0.80; p < 0.01), 
government bond 10-year yield (r = –0.72; p < 0.01); for Slovakia, abnegative 
correlation was demonstrated between the standardised fiscal rules index 
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and government bond 10-year yield (r = –0.93; p < 0.001); and for Poland, 
this relationship was the lowest, but it was there (r = 0.50). This resulted 
from public debt rules being implemented or successively strengthened in 
the respective years. The recent economic crisis and its consequences for 
public finance in respective countries greatly increased the interest, also in 
V4, in the rules relating to the level of debt, as in most countries the reduc-
tion of debt became one of the main dimensions of the fiscal policy (the 
results obtained in Pearson’s r model for the Czech Republic demonstrated 
that there was ab statistically significant and positive correlation between 
the standardised fiscal rules index and public debt as abpercentage of gross 
domestic product (GDP) (r = 0.71; p < 0.01), Slovakia’s debt (GDP) r = 0.88; 
p < 0.001; it cannot be concluded that such abcorrelation exists for Poland 
and Hungary. Such abresearch result may suggest that the rules formulated 
in Slovakia and the Czech Republic fail to meet the expected function, i.e. 
they do not contribute to stabilising or lowering public debt. The anti-cyclical 
definition of public debt rules can be strengthened by applying the ‘exit 
clause’ by means of discretionary revenues. The research outcome demon-
strated that the defined public debt rules in the V4 countries helped avoid 
negative outcomes for economic growth. Meanwhile, regarding total general 
government expenditure in millions of euros (basic research), its positive 
correlation with the standardised fiscal rules index was recorded in three 
countries. The only exception was Hungary, where the relationships are 
insignificant. The same potential ‘traps’ were true for deficit rules, especially 
with respect to the stabilising function of public finance.
The third category of factors tested in the model involves correlations 
between standardised fiscal rules and social development indicators. In 
this matter, we arrive at relationships that confirm diverse outcomes for 
socio-economic development of respective Visegrad Group countries. 
The analysed results of the correlation with the level of the standardised 
fiscal rules index were statistically significant in both positive and negative 
terms: the standardised fiscal rules index was statistically and positively 
correlated with Gini coefficient for Slovakia (r = 0.80; p < 0.01) and sta-
tistically significantly and negatively correlated with the same indicator for 
Poland (r = –0.67; p < 0.05). Such abresult indicates that the fiscal rules used 
have ab diverse impact on income stratification. An especially interesting 
case is that of Slovakia, which stands out among the economies analysed. 
This could be due to this country’s joining the monetary union and to the 
resulting increase in the socio-economic security, being higher than in other 
countries, which, in the long term has ab positive impact on employment 
stabilisation and income level (Holscher, 2011). Consequently, it can be 
assumed that the research conducted confirmed that social progress and 
development is growing, as abrule, in proportion to GDP, but upon reach-
ing abcertain level of society’s wealth, it is hard to increase social progress 
by means of economic growth only. 
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6. Conclu sions
Sustainability finance includes two main lines of action: the first one 
is improving the structure used to finance sustainable economic growth 
favouring social inclusion, especially to finance the society’s long-term 
demand for innovation and infrastructure, and speeding up the transition 
to ablow-emission and resource-efficient economy. In this respect, maintain-
ing long-term stable sources of finance is of key importance. It is obvious 
that the main determinant in this area is developing proper relationships 
between demand and supply. Demand for debt determined by behaviour 
and structure of the debt market confirms absignificant role and importance 
of the financial market (including the monetary policy) in driving the fiscal 
policy, which is reflected in budget indicators (Hallerberg, Strauch, & von 
Hagen, 2007). This indication is currently gaining particular importance, 
as evidenced by active demand-driving measures aimed at shifting weight 
to domestic markets. This element is directly linked to the second line of 
action, namely the strengthening of financial stability and asset assessment, 
especially by improving the assessment and management of major long-term 
threats as well as intangible value drivers. 
The results presented in this analysis indicate that the following correla-
tions can be distinguished for V4 countries in the period analysed: fiscal rules 
have ab significant impact on the way financial markets perceive the fiscal 
measures adopted by the authorities, which translates into the public-sector 
cost of capital; the use of fiscal rules does not have abnegative impact on real 
economic growth, meaning that the defined fiscal rules have abpro-growth 
effect rather than ‘cool’ the economy; the rules in place are not resistant to 
economic shocks, they do not protect the public sector against instability at 
abtime of crisis (2009, Poland was an exception); as the impact of fiscal rules 
(measured with the European Commission’s index) on the economic policy 
gets stronger, the scale of their negative impact on social indicators increases, 
leading to abgreater level of social exclusion and income stratification.
The scale of those correlations varies depending on whether ab given 
state (Slovakia) is ab eurozone member or not yet, as is the case of the 
other three countries. A major factor which the model could not take 
account of is the state authorities’ attitude towards the government’s role 
in the economy and their endorsement of one of the contemporary trends 
of economic thought. The V4 countries have one crucial characteristic in 
common: They are countries with relatively young democracies and not yet 
fully-fledged civic societies.
Two groups of fiscal standards can be distinguished from the perspec-
tive of economic theory. The first, fiscal principles, is mostly aimed to limit 
government spending, budget deficits, and public debt to ensure public 
finance stability. The second group, fiscal rules, mostly intended to stabi-
lise macroeconomic fluctuation, was introduced as new principles of fiscal 
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management. When assessing the effectiveness of fiscal rules, focus must be 
placed on their structure and on their fitness for the socio-economic goals 
pursued. From an economic policy perspective it would be advisable for 
the European Commission to take greater account of sustainable develop-
ment factors when defining the fiscal rules index rather than focusing on 
amounts relating to GDP, which is far from perfection as abmeasurement 
of socio-economic development. 
Sustainable development means ‘better development’ and ‘better finance’, 
abdevelopment which is sustainable in all of its economic and social aspects 
with stable public finance. In this context, the challenge facing the contem-
porary world, especially the European Union Member States, is to allocate 
the resources available even more efficiently to ensure that they give the best 
possible result not only in the form of an increasing GDP, but also – and 
maybe first and foremost – that of improving the population’s living standards. 
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